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Chapter pages in book: (p. 64 - 65)labor forcepropensity of old persons is not likely to go below prewar
levels. Declines for this group were due in the past tothewidening
of social security (Sec.5),but the extension of old age insurance in
the postwar period cannot, so far as the number covered is. concerned,
do more than take the place of charity in the prewar.
All in all, a peacetime return to prewar labor force propensities is
foreseeable, provided permanent casualties are not extreme. The labor
force, therefore, is likely to be larger than before this war only in
proportion to the population growth. Our prospective problem is to
find jobs in peacetime industry for those members of the normal labor
force who are in the service or in civilian jobs that end with the war.
Even if the wartime additions to the labor force do withdraw,
their jobs cannot all be turned over to the returning soldiers, because
a great many of these jobs also will evaporate with the war. Many
jobs, however, that have temporarily been filled by civilian new-
comers, will be restored to the primary wage earners and many of
the persons withdrawing from the total labor force will be service
men themselves who leave to go back to school. The withdrawals
that do occur, moreover, will relieve the pressure for jobs at a very
crucial time. As the standards of employability rise again, the per-
centage of unemployables among these wartime additions, consider-
ing who they are, would surely become quite big and the exodus from
the labor force will avert a considerable part of the unemployment
certain to occur even in the face of a strong demand for labor.
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion of this paper is that the possibilities of net
additions to the normal labor force in wartime have been exaggerated.
When from a tenth to a third of the normal labor force goes into
the military services the civilian labor force apparently suffers a
net loss. If American, British, and German peacetime experience is
typical, the labor force is not very sensitive to economic shocks; and
differences in labor force propensities among nations are accounted
for in large part by traditional differences in social structures, and
do not reflect disparities in national management.
The wartime evidence supports five conclusions. First, most of
the supposed additions to the normal labor force in World War I
were illusory. Perhaps in none of the three countries was. the illusion
greater than in the United States.
Second, in this war some real net increases in the total labor force
[64)have been made in all three countries. They were bigger than in
the preceding, because much greater reserves doubtless existed out-
side the labor force after two decades of falling births and rising
school enrollment and improving old age security. Before this war
the United States reserve propensity was probably highest. Neverthe-
less, none of the three countries was able in either war to keep up
its civilian labor force from its native population.
Third, the labor force propensity in the United States is still far
below that in Britain, although it has already risen as much in this
country as it rose during two years of peril in Great Britain. It is not,
however, safe to view the high British propensities as goals for this
country. Seemingly unattributable to either superior war manage-
ment or patriotism, they are in direct proportion to the smaller per-
centage of British women 'with children to care for and the smaller
percentage of British children attending school. These differences
between the two countries are longstanding.
Fourth, although during 1942withdrawalsof males 20-44from
the American civilian labor force were replaced by females and
elderly men and young boys, during 1943thewithdrawals were
hardly replaced at all. During 1944itis proposed to induct another
million or so men, a large percentage of whom will be fathers.
One source to replace them is women and school children. Full-
or part-time work by students will be resisted by parents and edu-
cators as well as by the children themselves; part-time work will be
further blocked by the difficulties employers find in using them effec-
tively. Women will be averse to working full- or part-time as over-
time employment of wage earners and the drying up of household
services add to their chores at home. The more work the government
succeeds in stimulating persons already in the civilian labor force to
turn out, the fewer additional persons is it likely to get to replace its
withdrawals for military service.
Finally, judging from the past stability of the labor force pro-
pensity, most of the war additions to the labor force seem likely to
go out with the war's end, leaving the labor force larger only by
reason of the growth in population. If so, we shall be able to con-
centrate on converting war jobs to peace without being troubled
much with creating new jobs, especially if a military force of two
or three million men is maintained. Those who believe that children
and married women are most effective in school and in the nursery
will welcome this simplification of the postwar job problem.
[65)